Benjamin Franklin remarked in 1789 that 'in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes'. 1 To these certainties the economist would add the scarcity of resources, and the consequent need for careful resource allocation, which in healthcare is usually labelled 'rationing'. The fiscal and monetary stimuli introduced to mitigate the global recession will mean that in the UK, after the next election, scarcity in public services will be acute. In these circumstances, the role of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) as a rationing body for the NHS becomes even more important.
At the same time, NICE is exhibiting continued and new problems in rationing access to healthcare. Industry, ably supported by patient groups they fund directly and 'pro bono', have challenged NICE decisions about some cancer drugs which are of inadequate clinical effectiveness and poor cost-effectiveness. 2 The consequent debate about NICE and patient 'top-ups' has led to a report by the Cancer Czar, Professor Mike Richards, 3 and a government response. 4 This has set out clear rules to separate private and NHS activity which national opinion and international evidence indicate will be difficult to implement and enforce. 5 The top-up debate has raised two central issues about the regulation of the pharmaceutical market and the role of NICE: how to determine drug prices and how, if at all, to deal differently with 'rare' and 'end of life' interventions when making resource allocation decisions in healthcare.
Various forms of the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) have, since 1957, regulated companies' rates of return on historic capital, but left companies virtually free to set prices. If profits exceeded a generous rate of return, usually around 21%, government has sought repayments and price cuts. Such action has been unusual. The Office of Fair Trading 6 criticized PPRS and argued that 'value-based pricing' 7 could save the NHS half a billion pounds. This intuitively appealing concept has influenced the design of the new PPRS, operational since the start of 2009. 8 However, the government has proceeded with a level of caution and ambiguity that may undermine the rationing capacity of NICE. Part of the new PPRS establishes a 'Patient Access Scheme', whose role is 'to facilitate early patient access to medicines that may not, in the first instance, be found to be cost and clinically effective by NICE'. 8 This has resulted in draft proposals for a Patient Access Scheme Liaison Unit within NICE, which will advise Ministers about whether to allow early introduction of such products. Industry may be able to take advantage of either front-loaded schemes, which allow high price introduction but with agreement of repayments if evidence fails to demonstrate improved cost-effectiveness, or back loaded schemes which introduce the products at a lower price but allow prices to increase if research subsequent to launch demonstrates improved clinical and cost-effectiveness.
Great caution is needed with such schemes. For instance, the front-loaded scheme adopted for beta interferon for multiple sclerosis, after NICE rejected the product, remains somewhat clouded in mystery, with the initial research team at Sheffield University ceding its evaluative role less than four years after the launch of the planned 10-year evaluation. 9 There has been little reporting of evaluative data and no consideration so far of reimbursement of the NHS. Should drugs of unproven clinical and cost-effectiveness be made available to patients with financial risk shared by the NHS, rather than increased investment in more definitive clinical trials being the obligation of industry? NICE has been parsimonious in its referral of unproven products for more research evidence, and should perhaps be more robust with industry, requiring it to provide good evidence of cost-effectiveness or face rejection of NHS reimbursement.
Instead, the usual response by industry is advocacy of consideration of incentives for investment in 'rare diseases' and 'end-of-life care', both of which may in principle generate a lower return on investment. But given that increasingly new drugs are 'designer' technologies for small subgroups of patients, often with particular genetic characteristics, many new products can be viewed as treatment for 'rare' diseases. For example, while breast cancer is not a particularly rare condition, treatments such as trastuzumab (Herceptin) are clinically effective only for a subgroup of patients -in this case, those who have HER-2 breast cancer. Does this make it a rare condition? For the 'rarer' cancers, the argument is that there should be special consideration of patient subgroups of 7000 or less. Again, the central issue is demonstrable costeffectiveness rather than special consideration.
The concept of 'end-of-life' care is equally debatable. How is 'end of life' defined, and is it reasonable to prioritize more highly products that may extend the life of those with a terminal illness for perhaps a few months than products that, for example, improve quality of life over very many years? For both end-of-life care and rare diseases, the argument is essentially advocacy of investment which may be viewed as inefficient, and consideration must be given to whether these arguments are robust enough to justify inefficiency in order to achieve other desired objectives. NICE uses, de facto, a rationing cut-off of £30,000 per QALY. 10 The 'top-up' debate and the discussion of 'rare' diseases and 'end-of-life' care have given rise to suggestions that this cut-off be raised to circa £70,000 for these 'special cases'. 11 This would mean that some patients would be treated very differently from the majority of patients. This inequity would be compounded by inefficiency: funding at £70,000 per QALY would displace existing procedures which may be far more cost-effective. 12 Instead of confused advocacy of more generous rationing criteria for subgroups of patients, NICE and government should implement more parsimonious criteria. Research into rationing criteria use by PCTs indicates that their cut-off is below £20,000 per QALY. 13 The case for NICE-PCT consistency in rationing is as strong as the need to be even more rigorous in funding marginal technologies for use in the NHS.
These 'wobbles' in NICE procedures are a product of the political consequences of the 'top-up' debate and confusion in the Department of Health, which is both the guardian of value for money in the NHS and the Whitehall sponsor of the pharmaceutical industry. NICE resistance to these pressures is essential as the NHS and its patients can not afford it departing from rigorous appraisal of the clinical and cost effectiveness of new procedures in a period of acute economic crisis.
